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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature Of The Case
The State of Idaho appeals from the district court's order denying
restitution.

Statement Of The Facts And Course Of The Proceedings
Cameron David Harer pied guilty to one count of possession of heroin as
part of a plea agreement whereby the state dismissed another count of
possession of heroin and a sentencing enhancement for a repeat offense. (R.,
pp. 75-76.)

The state requested restitution for the costs of investigation and

prosecution in the amount of $410, but the court ordered restitution for only the
cost of investigation in the amount of $200. (R., pp. 80, 86-97, 101-06; Tr., p. 3,
Ls. 1-3; p. 3, L. 14 - p. 4, L. 12; p. 6, Ls. 2-17.) The state filed a timely notice of
appeal from the judge's order denying restitution for the cost of prosecution. (R.,
pp. 108-110.)

1

ISSUE
Did the district court err when it concluded that the state is entitled to
recover the costs of prosecution under I.C. § 37-2732(k) only if the state suffers
"economic loss," which it does not suffer in "routine drug cases"?
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ARGUMENT
The District Court Erred When It Narrowed The Scope Of I.C. § 37-2732(k) In
Contravention Of Its Plain Language

A

Introduction
The district court denied restitution for the prosecutor's salary for time

worked on the case. (R, pp. 101-06.) It did so concluding the "State has made
no showing of economic loss" because this was a "routine drug case" and
"prosecuting costs" are "part of the general expense of maintaining the system of
courts and the administration of justice and are more properly the ordinary
burden of government rather than the defense."

(R, pp. 105-06 footnote

omitted).) The court then denied the requested restitution for prosecution salary
costs because the state failed to "show why this case is any different than the
standard criminal case." (R, p. 106.) The district court erred by imposing an
extra-statutory burden of proof upon the state.

B.

Standard Of Review
The interpretation and construction of a statute present questions of law

over which the appellate court exercises free review.

State v. Thompson, 140

Idaho 796,798,102 P.3d 1115, 1117 (2004).

C.

The District Court Erred By Requiring Proof Of Non-Statutory Factors
The objective of statutory interpretation is to give effect to legislative

intent State v. Pina, 149 Idaho 140, 144, 233 P.3d 71, 75 (2010); Robison v.
Bateman-Hall, Inc., 139 Idaho 207, 210, 76 P.3d 951, 954 (2003). Because the
best guide to legislative intent is the wording of the statute itself, the

3

interpretation of a statute must begin with its literal words.

Verska v. Saint

Alphonsus Reg'I Med. Ctr., 151 Idaho 889, 893, 265 P.3d 502, 506 (2011 ); State
v. Doe, 147 Idaho 326, 328, 208 P.3d 730, 732 (2009). The words of a statute
'"must be given their plain, usual, and ordinary meaning; and the statute must be
construed as a whole. If the statute is not ambiguous, this Court does not
construe it, but simply follows the law as written."' Verska, 151 Idaho at 893, 265
P.3d at 506 (quoting State v. Schwartz, 139 Idaho 360, 362, 79 P.3d 719, 721
(2003)).

"[W]here statutory language is unambiguous, legislative history and

other extrinsic evidence should not be consulted for the purpose of altering the
clearly expressed intent of the legislature." kL_ (quoting City of Sun Valley v. Sun
Valley Co., 123 Idaho 665,667,851 P.2d 961,963 (1993)).
The applicable statute is I.C. § 37-2732(k), which in relevant part reads:
Upon conviction of a felony ... under this chapter ... the
court may order restitution for costs incurred by law enforcement
agencies in investigating the violation. Law enforcement agencies
shall include ... county ... prosecuting attorney offices. Costs shall
include ... prosecution expenses actually incurred, including regular
salaries of employees.
Under this plain language, the request for the portion of the salary expended to
pay the prosecutor to pursue the charges is awardable. The district court erred
as a matter of law by concluding that the request for restitution for prosecutor
salary is not awardable under this statute unless the state proves an "economic
loss" in excess of the "general expense of maintaining the system of court and
the administration of justice." (R., pp. 105-06.) The statute in no way makes an
award of restitution contingent upon such a showing.
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Nor may the district court impose a duty to prove extra-statutory elements
as an exercise of discretion.

Use of the word "may" in l.C. § 37-2732(k) shows

that the award of restitution is discretionary, and not mandatory.
127 Idaho 841,848,908 P.2d 143, 150 (1995).

Rife v. Long,

"Thus, should a trial court

determine that the connection between the defendant's conviction and the
'investigative costs' sought through the state's restitution request is tenuous or
that the amounts sought are inflated or unreasonably incurred, it possesses the
discretion to deny all or part of the state's restitution request."

State v.

Mosqueda, 150 Idaho 839, 835, 252 P.3d 563, 368 (Ct. App. 2010). 1 The court
may not, however, as a matter of discretion, simply re-write the statutory
requirements.
In this case the district court correctly recognized that there "is no
question" salaries of prosecuting attorneys expended in the prosecution of a drug
felony are recoverable under this statute.

(R., p. 103.)

The court also

recognized that it had discretion because the statute provides that the court
"may" order this restitution. (R., p. 105.) It then, however, required the state to
prove that the case was "different than the standard criminal case" in order to be

The state does not believe that the factor identified in Mosqueda (tenuous or
inflated requests) is exclusive, but does believe it is representative. Thus, factors
such as reasonableness of the request, whether it is for an action tenuous to the
case, the defendant's financial circumstances, and whether the award of
restitution is compatible with the court's sentencing goals, including rehabilitation,
would all be proper considerations.
1
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eligible for an award of restitution for prosecution expenses. (R., pp. 105-06.2)
By doing so the district court imposed a burden on the state to prove an element
not found in the statute in order to obtain restitution.
A trial court abuses its discretion if it incorrectly perceives the scope of its
discretion because it has misinterpreted the statute it is applying.

State v.

Anderson, 152 Idaho 21, 22-23, 266 P.3d 496, 297-98 (Ct. App. 2011 ). Here the
district court misinterpreted I.C. § 37-2732(k) as not applying to "routine" drug
cases. (R., pp. 105-06.)

By excluding an entire category of cases not excluded

by the statute, the court clearly limited its discretion in a way inconsistent with the
applicable statutory language.
The district court misinterpreted I.C. § 37-2732(k) by holding that it does
not apply to routine cases.

By doing so it limited its discretion in a fashion

contrary to the plain language of the statute. The court erred as a matter of law,
and also as a matter of discretion.

The district court's logic is also deeply flawed. The court reasoned there was no
"economic loss" because the case was "routine" and "routine" cases are merely
part of the "general expense" of maintaining a criminal justice system. (R., pp.
105-06.) By definition, however, "routine" cases constitute most of the cases
addressed by the criminal justice system, otherwise they would not be "routine."
Thus, most of the expenses of the criminal justice system are incurred handling
"routine" rather than exceptional cases. Nothing in the statutory language
suggests that the legislature meant to impose restitution in only the most
expensive cases.
2
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CONCLUSION
The state respectfully requests this Court to reverse the district court's
Decision on Restitution and remand for further proceedings consistent with the
statutory language of I.C. § 37-2732(k).
DATED this 11th day of September, 2015.

KENNETH K. JORG N EN
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